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The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and

Competition Law in Canada
by Ivan R. Feltham, Q.C.*
INTRODUCTION

This presentation will be preceded in the conference by two papers
which deal with Canadian and U.S. competition law and those will
have provided a substantial introduction to the general principles of U.S.
antitrust law and competition law in Canada. I will also assume that it
follows Mr. Arnold's excellent paper which will have identified issues
that are relevant under the laws of both Canada and the United States.
First, it will be useful to identify briefly the statutory or common
law basis for intellectual property rights in Canada. With some qualification with regard to trade marks, intellectual property rights described as
patents, registered industrial designs, copyrights and trade marks are created by federal law (Canada Act, Section 91).
Briefly stated, patents are provided for under the Patent Act (Revised Statutes of Canada 1970, Chapter P-4) which states in Section 46
that:
Every patent granted under this Act shall.., grant to the patentee and
his legal representatives for the term therein mentioned, from the
granting of the patent, the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used the said intervention, subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any court of
competent jurisdiction.
Thus, the Patent Act confers upon the patent holder an exclusive
property right in the claim or claims described in the patent. That others
may be excluded by suitable proceedings, from exclusive right is, by the
nature of the constitutional foundation for the grant, coextensive with
the territory of the granting authority, namely, Canada.
Similarly, an industrial design (a shape, pattern or ornament as applied to an article of manufacture and discernible by mere viewing) is
exclusively the property of the registrant under the Industrial Design Act
(R.S.C. Chapter 1-8 (1970)).
Under the Copyright Act (R.S.C. Chapter C-30 (1970)), original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works are protected from unauthorized copying. The protection arises without registration, but registration
does enhance the position of the copyright owner.
* Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd.
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Trade marks are somewhat different in that protection of a trade
mark or trade name is embodied in the Common Law, but is enhanced
by the process of registration under the Trade Marks Act (R.S.C. Chapter T-10 (1970)).
The foregoing will not be sufficient to satisfy anyone familiar with
those arcane fields of law, but will suffice for the purposes of this paper.
The essential point is that the owner of an intellectual property right may
enjoy his bundle of rights which constitute the intellectual property, and
this bundle of rights or property is similar in many respects to other
commonly recognized forms of property whether real or personal.
Although they may be embodied in tangible objects, intellectual property
rights are essentially conceptual and this feature may make it more difficult to define the limits of appropriate exploitation of the property than is
the case with tangible goods or realty.
It is important to note that I do not approach the subject of this
discussion from the point of view that intellectual property rights are the
grant of any kind of privilege by the state. I consider them rights or
property with peculiar definitional characteristics just as any other property which may be inherited, transferred by assignment, expropriated,
etc., depending on other relevant areas of law and the nature of the property itself.
Having said this, it follows that there is no problematical mystery in
identifying the issue as to what limits, with regard to the exploitation of
intellectual property, may be imposed by competition laws of general application. I do not think it is useful, indeed I think it is misleading and
improper, to approach intellectual property laws as some kind of exemption or carve-out from competition laws. Although the question is
straight forward, the answer is not readily found.
With regard to practical significance in the context of competition
law considerations, the patent has been the subject of great concern and
much debate. This is undoubtedly the result of the leverage afforded to
the owner of a patent on a valuable invention. Industrial designs and
trade marks do not lend themselves to the same exploitation through
leverage. One might say that one can leverage off a patent a substantial
number of benefits which others are willing to agree to and pay for while
industrial designs and trade marks are exploitable in a much narrower
sense. This has in historical perspective been largely the case also with
copyrights, but the modern importance of computer software will prove
to be equally important, if it has not already done so.
It is important to note the difference and make a distinction between
the property right itself and contractual rights or obligations which may
be built on and around the property.
There has been a lot of debate about the desirability of granting patent protection and more particularly about the details of such protection
in specific fields, such as pharmaceuticals. Although it is widely recognized that innovation is desirable and some exclusive protection of the
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results of innovation is necessary to encourage innovation, there is uneasiness about anyone holding exclusive, unqualified rights to a valuable invention when it is perceived that utilization by others (presumably upon
payment of a reasonable fee) would contribute significantly to the public
good. It is perhaps too simplistic to draw the analogy with the man who
owns a hundred acres of park land and to whom it might be suggested he
should open fifty or sixty acres for public enjoyment.
For the purposes of this paper, one is tempted to say that it is not
necessary to get into the debate about the appropriateness of whether
patents should be generously or restrictively granted with reference to
the innovative features as displayed by the disclosure and the various
other issues that were debated, for example, in the Working Paper on
Patent Law Revision (Canada, Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1976)
and the Economic Council of Canada Report on Intellectual and Industrial Property (January 1971). These followed the extensive reports of
the Royal Commission on Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Industrial Designs (Report on Copyright 1957, and Report on Patents 1960).
To ignore the process by which the property rights are determined and
granted, and the extent of the property rights so granted, leaves one feeling uneasy that an essential part of the inquiry is being neglected. However, whatever the nature of the grant, there will always be a potential
interface between the property rights so created and the competition law
of general application. So let us pursue the conventional approach and
examine the elements of competition law which may be relevant. I shall
leave for later reference the provisions of the Canadian Patent Act which
deal with, to use the marginal note, "abuse of rights under patents."
Related in practical terms to the intellectual property rights created
or protected by statute, secret information (know-how; show-how) is
often associated with patents. Indeed, trade secrets are an essential part
of the intellectual property, broadly defined, which may be a valuable
asset of any business. Licensing all or any part of a package of related
patents, etc. and trade secrets may involve various restrictions and other
conditions which raise antitrust issues. The differences among the various scenarios is that where, for example, a patent is involved, certain
power to impose conditions may be said to be necessarily implied by the
statutory patent grant, while in the case of secret information there is no
such basis for using the license grant as a Christmas tree to hang on a
variety of ornaments. Still, the basic concept is the same: I have property in the trade secrets in the sense that they are capable of being transferred to others, or alternatively kept to myself for my exclusive use. Not
being obliged to disclose my trade secrets, I may argue persuasively that
if I do choose to share them with another, I should be able to impose any
condition I wish.
THE COMPETITION

ACT

The Canadian Competition Law, which has appeared in various
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forms in the Criminal Code and the Combines Investigation Act since
1889, presently appears in the statute called the Competition Act which
came into effect June 19, 1986. At the same time, the Competition Tribunal Act created the special tribunal to adjudicate certain issues referred to in Part VII of the Competition Act.
Note first the grand purpose of the Act (Section 1.1).
To maintain and encourage competition in Canada;
In order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian
economy;
In order to expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world
markets;
In order to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an
equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy; and
In order to provide consumers with competitive prices and product
choices.
To what extent do intellectual property rights and their utilization
conflict with those ideals (in many respects conflicting in themselves) and
how does the Competition Act implement that purpose?
First, the Act, in section 39, directs itself specifically to the exclusive
rights and privileges conferred by one or more patents for invention or by
one or more trade marks. Furthermore, where use has been made of
those rights and privileges (the following is paraphrased) to restrain or
injure unduly trade or commerce in relation to any article or commodity
which may be the subject of trade or commerce, or to prevent, limit or
lessen unduly the manufacture or production of any such articles or commodity or unreasonably to enhance the price thereof, or to prevent or
lessen unduly competition in the production, manufacture, purchase,
barter, sale transportation or supply of any such article or commodity,
the Federal Court may on the application of the Attorney General of
Canada (i) declare any license or a part thereof void, or (ii) restrain any
person from carrying out the terms of any such agreement, or (iii) direct
the granting of a license, or (iv) revoke a patent or expunge or amend the
registration of a trade mark, or (v) direct that such other acts be done or
omitted as the court may deem necessary to prevent any such use (i.e.,
abuse). There is a saving provision that no order shall be made under the
section that is at variance with any treaty, convention, arrangement or
engagement with any other country respecting patents or trade marks to
which Canada is a party.
Despite the breadth of this declaration of public policy, the section
has been used very little during its long history. Indeed there are only
two cases referred to in the Reports of the Director of Investigation and
Research during the last couple of decades, both of which involved
Union Carbide of Canada. Both cases were settled after agreed variations of the licensing arrangements.
Section 29 has had a long history and dates back to 1906. However,
in 1937, Parliament repealed this section (then section 30). In comment-
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ing on the repeal of that section, Maclean J. in Thermionics Ltd. et al v.
Philco Products Ltd. et al, (1 Fox Patent Cases 166) observed:
I have no doubt the repeal of this section was attributable to the fact
that the Patent Act 1935, by sections 65 to 70 (now sections 67 to 72)
dealing with the abuse of exclusive rights granted by patents, conferred
upon the Attorney General of Canada, or any other interested party,
the right to apply to the Commissioner of Patents, after three years
from the date of the grant of any patent, for relief, in the case where it
was alleged that there had been an abuse of the exclusive rights
granted under any such patent.... Parliament would appear, in my
opinion, to have deliberately legislated so as to exclude from the operation of the Combines Investigation Act and the Criminal Code, anything in the nature of a monopoly derived from the exclusive rights
under a patent, and the Patent Act provides the procedure and the
remedies for the case where there had been an abuse of such exclusive
rights.
Notwithstanding this expression of opinion, in 1946 Parliament reenacted section 30, presumably in order to implement the McGregor Report on Canada and International Cartels (October 10, 1945). The
McGregor Report stated:
The Patent Act does indeed give to a patentee a "monopoly" in the
sense that it gives him the "exclusive rights, privilege and liberty of
making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used the said
invention," but it nowhere authorizes him to agree with other patentees to eliminate competition between them or to conspire to keep their
inventions away from outsiders.
In the period 1973 to 1977, several efforts were made to expand the
provision and to shift it to the sections which provide for review by a
specialized tribunal. All of these efforts were apparently intended to subject intellectual property fights to expanded powers of a specialized tribunal to regulate their use; i.e., to limit their use in circumstances where
thought to be occurring. Many observers perceived a bias against intellectual property.
Before commenting further on section 29 and the alternative of review by the Competition Tribunal, it is useful to refer next to section 32
which, using language very similar to section 29, defines the criminal
offense of conspiracy (equivalent to restraints of trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Act). It is significant that the Canadian Act imports a rule
of reason in all cases (except bid rigging as provided for in section 32.2
and price maintenance as provided for in section 38). To counterbalance
certain recent Canadian Supreme Court decisions or, at least, in an attempt to inject a note of certainty in a field of uncertainty caused by
recent decisions, section 32 (1.1) defines unduly in a negative way; i.e., in
stating that it is not necessary, to gain a conviction, to show that the
conspiracy, if carried into effect, would or would be likely to eliminate
completely or virtually all competition in the market, or that it was the
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object of any or all of the parties to eliminate completely or virtually
competition in that market. Nor is it necessary to prove that the parties
intended that the conspiracy combination agreement or arrangement
would have the effect which is set out in the charging section. The courts
have generally imposed on the government a substantial challenge to
demonstrate that competition has been lessened unduly. However, there
appear to be cases which challenge practices involving the use or alleged
abuse of intellectual property rights.
Although section 29 does not require an arrangement or agreement
which involves two or more parties, the similarity of the language and
the fact that it provides for the regulation of the exploitation of property
rights may lead reasonably to the conclusion that a court faced with an
application under section 29 would apply principles similar to those that
have been developed in interpreting the word "unduly" under section 32
or its predecessors. In view of the recent development of reviewable
practices now set out in Part VII of the Act, and the debate in the legislative history about the desirability of the application of the civil law standard of proof on a balance of probabilities rather than the criminal law
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it might be argued that
section 29 which provides no criminal sanction, should also be applied by
the same standard as any other civil or administrative proceedings; i.e.,
proof on a reasonable balance of probabilities. Viewed, however, as a
potential restriction on the enjoyment of property rights, the section
probably should be applied only on a showing of substantial proof of
harm.
Taken together, the sections give the Attorney General the option to
proceed under section 29 against the owner of the patent or trade mark
for a regulatory order (or revocation of the patent or expungement of the
trademark) or, if a conspiracy is involved, to proceed under the criminal
law provision of section 32. Also, the Attorney General may seek, under
section 30, an injunction that prohibits the apprehended violation of the
anti-conspiracy section. It would appear therefore that the Attorney
General may exercise his prosecutorial discretion to not lay a criminal
charge but rather to seek an order that prohibits the offense or the continuation of it. One of the many changes proposed in recent years (but
not enacted) would have made section 29 specifically and only applicable
in the case of an alleged violation of section 32.
It is also notable that any person who has been injured as the result
of a violation of section 32 may sue for and recover any damages suffered
by him as a result of the illegal action, including his full costs of proceeding under the civil damages section. As a practical matter, it is difficult
to mount a civil action in the absence of a previous criminal investigation
and conviction. But it is possible to do so, and indeed an action in conspiracy is not necessarily founded on the Competition Act (see Beaubien
v. Canadian General Electric, Westinghouse Canada and Sylvania Canada, 30 C.P.R. 2d 100 (Que. S. Ct. 1976). However, the plaintiff in that
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case did make extensive use of the evidence in the previous conviction
under section 32 of the same defendants.
Also in the criminal offenses part of the Competition Act is the antiprice discrimination provision (section 34). It is perhaps arguable
whether this section could be applied to licenses of a patent or other
intellectual property. The section requires that there be a practice of selling an article to competitors of each other at a discriminatory price, and
it is hard to conceive that a license of a right to use intellectual property
could be regarded as the sale of an article; although the word article is
defined to mean personal property of every description. The rights of a
licensee are a kind of personal property, distinct from the intellectual
property rights themselves, and it might be argued that the right to use
the property is the subject of a sale in a typical licensing situation. In my
view, this is an unwarranted distortion of the fairly clear intent of the
section, which is to deal with sales as we ordinarily understand them.
Unlike section 34, the anti-price maintenance section (section 38, as
amended in 1976) clearly makes it a criminal offense for anyone who has
the exclusive right and privilege as conferred by a patent, trademark,
copyright, or registered industrial design to attempt, by agreement,
threat, promise, or any like means, to influence upward or discourage the
reduction of the price at which any other person supplies or offers to
supply or advertises a product within Canada. It is an offense to refuse
to supply a product because of the low pricing policy of the purchaser.
Although product is broadly defined to include a service and an article, it
appears that in this case, as well as under section 34, it would be a distortion of the provision to apply it to the refusal to license intellectual property rights. The overall intent, however, of the section is clearly
indicated and a court might well interpret a license as the supply of a
service or of personal property.
Several reviewable practices were added to the competition law in
1976 (refusal to deal, consignment selling, exclusive dealing, tied selling,
and market restriction) and a new provision was added in 1986 (abuse of
dominant position) to replace the old anti-monopoly provision which was
dropped.
Dealing first with the newest provisions (sections 50 and 51), the
concept is that the Tribunal, upon the application of the Director of Investigation and Research, may in certain conditions prohibit the persons
charged from engaging in a practice of anti-competitive acts. To bring
the section into action, however, the Tribunal must find that one or more
persons substantially or completely control a class or species of business
throughout Canada or in any part of Canada, that the person or persons
have engaged in or are engaging in a practice of anti-competitive acts,
and that the practice has had, is having, or is likely to have the effect of
preventing or lessening competition substantially in a market. Section 50
contains an illustrative list of anti-competitive acts which, generally
speaking, describe situations where a competitor is abusing market power
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for a predatory or exclusionary purpose. The use of the term anti-competitive clearly implies that ordinary acts of active, vigorous competition
are not to be the subject of regulation under that section. Furthermore,
the section specifically states (section 51 (5)) that an act engaged in pursuant only to the exercise of any right or enjoyment of any interest derived under the Copyright Act, Industrial Design Act, Patent Act, Trade
Marks Act, or any other Act of Parliament pertaining to intellectual or
industrial property is not an anti-competitive act. This provision is continued from the definition of monopoly which had existed for many years
in the Combines Investigation Act, the predecessor to the Competition
Act. The 1986 revision extended the exemptions by referring specifically
to other statutes in addition to the Patent Act, and limits the basket reference to any other property. Presumably, "any right or enjoyment of
any interest derived under" will be literally interpreted to mean, for example, the refusal to grant a license, but will not protect the exploitation
of market power by leveraging off and beyond the property right itself.
Whatever solace owners of intellectual property rights may gain from the
exemption in section 51, they must remember that section 29 specifically
addresses them insofar as they may be perceived to be utilizing their
property rights so as to unduly restrain or injure competition generally,
or in the ways described particularly in that section. Nor does the saving
sub-section have any operation in the face of section 32, the criminal
conspiracy section, or any other section.
So far, the score against the intellectual property owner is two civil
remedies, one which may be initiated by the Director of Investigation
and Research, and the other by the Attorney General of Canada (two
distinct arms of the Government of Canada), and one criminal law sanction (again, generally initiated by the Attorney General of Canada upon
information supplied to him by the Director of Investigation and Research) and the ancillary civil remedy of a prohibition order issued by a
court on the initiative of the Attorney General where alleged or apprehended violation of a criminal provision is shown.
It is arguable that some of the other matters reviewable by the Tribunal may be applicable to licenses or other contracts involving intellectual property. In my view, these sections, which deal with refusal to
deal, exclusive dealing, tied selling and market restrictions, are fairly
clearly intended to apply to the supply of an article or a service, although
the definition of "article," as noted before, includes personal property of
every description and might be held to apply to the supply of rights to
use intellectual property. Similarly, a show-how license might be construed as a service. With regard to refusal to deal, however, it seems to
me that the concept is entirely at odds with the notion of the right to
refuse to license at all. Section 67 of the Patent Act, in particular section
67 (1)(i)(d), applies to some extent to the same situation. In any case, it
is likely that the Tribunal would defer to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner (or the court, under section 29) and would not attempt to distort
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the refusal to deal section of the Competition Act to the extent needed in
order to apply it to refusal to license. Similarly, it seems that the exclusive dealing and/or tied selling concepts (Competition Act, section 49),
while the broadest definition of product and customer might include the
licensing of a patent or other intellectual property rights, were not intended to reach the case of a licensor who attempts to impose upon his
licensee the obligation to deal only in products of the licensor (as in the
case of the supply of components for the licensed products). I am fortified in this view by the provision which makes it a precondition for action
by the Tribunal that it must be shown that exclusive dealing or tied selling is engaged in by a major supplier of a product in a market or because
the practice is widespread in a market. Moreover, the market restriction
concept also refers to the supplier of a product and his customer, hardly
terms generally understood to apply to license arrangements. As in the
case of exclusive dealing and tied selling, it must also be shown that the
practice is engaged in by a major supplier of a product or is widespread
in relation to a product. It is hardly necessary for the Competition Tribunal to distort these sections in view of the fact that adequate remedies
are available elsewhere in the same statute (section 29) or in the Patent
Act (section 67).
There has been no significant jurisprudence in respect of any of these
provisions where the exploitation of intellectual property right was at the
heart of the issue. Canadian General Electric and Union Carbide Canada were charged with monopolization under the Combines Investigation Act in that during a period from 1960 to 1972, [of] "substantially or
completely controlling throughout Canada the business of manufacturing, supplying and selling crosslinkable [sic] polyethylene compounds for
use as insulation for electrical wire and cable [... they] have operated or
are likely to operate such business to the detriment or against the interest
of the public." At first reluctant to license anyone to produce cross-linkable polyethylene, CGE finally agreed to grant a nonexclusive license to
Union Carbide to make, use and sell cross-linkable polyethylene as covered by the patent, but with the condition that the license to sell did not
extend to any sale made by Union Carbide to a purchaser of the product
for wire and cable application who did not have the in-house expertise
and capability to mix the cross-linkable polyethylene with other ingredients prior to extrusion as an insulating coating for power cables. The
possession and use of a "Banbury mixer" and the regular employment of
a skilled compounding chemist by the purchaser were the principal requirements. Four major producers of wire and cable qualified but many
others did not. It was therefore alleged that CGE and Union Carbide
had monopolized the business of cross-linkable polyethylene insulation to
the detriment of the public.
Of course, it is instantly obvious that a fundamental question is
whether that particular kind of insulation is a class or species of business
where there were several other insulation techniques and materials com-

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:149 1987

monly in use. In dismissing the case at the preliminary hearing, Judge
Charles of the Ontario Provincial Court based his decision not only on
the class or species of business issue but found also, by relying on a series
of U.S. cases, that a patentee could not be found guilty of a monopoly
offense unless he used his licensing arrangement to extend the scope of
the patent grant. Applying that line of reasoning, he found that CGE's
licensing policy was not an attempt to extend the scope of its patent
rights. Although Judge Charles stated his intention to provide written
reasons following his dismissal of the charge from the bench, he shortly
thereafter suffered an injury and written reasons were never released.
The Government did not choose to refer an indictment directly to the
Superior Court, although it had the option of doing so. If a similar case
were brought under the new section which deals with "abuse of monopoly," Judge Charles' rationale would also likely apply to protect the restrictive practice as the exercise of a right derived under the patent grant.
By that case, it was assumed that the Government was attempting to
test the scope of the monopoly provisions in connection with patent
rights, as it had done earlier with respect to section 29 in two actions
against Union Carbide Canada (various patents dealing with polyethylene film and techniques for printing thereon) and in a few cases (otherwise not reported) referred to by Mr. Henderson in his address to the
Patent and Trade Mark Institute of Canada in 1981 (Bulletin of the
PTIC, volume 13, page 840). Not one of these cases were litigated to a
judicial decision. It is significant that in the insulation case, the Government elected to proceed exclusively under the then Section 33 by alleging
a joint monopoly but did not proceed under Section 29 or 32.
ABUSE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS GRANTED BY A PATENT -

THE

PATENT ACT

Canada introduced into its law, at a very early stage, the concept
that a patent monopoly became void after a period of time if the subject
matter of the patented invention was not being manufactured in Canada.
The Patent Act of 1869 set a three year period from the date of patent
grant, after which manufacture in Canada must be commenced, and continuously carried on, in order to maintain the patent. The Act also provided for avoidance of the patent if the subject matter of the patent was
imported after eighteen months from the date of grant. In 1872, the
above periods were reduced to two years and one year respectively.
The law did not change until 1923, when, in order to permit Canada
to join the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, a
comprehensive amendment to these provisions were made to essentially
conform to the abuses provisions in the British Act of 1907. Subsequent
amendments were made in 1935 and the abuse provisions adopted by the
1935 Act are still in effect today. Under the present statute, the Attorney
General of Canada or any person interested may, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the date of grant of a patent, apply to the
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Commissioner alleging an abuse of the exclusive rights and request relief
as provided for in the Act.
Sections 66 to 73 of the present Patent Act deal with the abuse of
rights granted under patents. Section 67 sets forth the following circumstances in which the exclusive rights shall be deemed to have been
abused:
(1) Section 67 (2)(a)
Failure to work the patented invention on a commercial scale in
Canada. The term "work on a commercial scale" means the manufacture of the article or the carrying on of the process described and claimed
in a specification for a patent, in or by means of a definite and substantial
establishment or organization and on a scale that is adequate and reasonable under the circumstances."
(2) Section 67 (2)(b)
Importation of the patented article by the patentee or his licensee or by persons against whom the patentee has not taken infringement
proceedings, if such importation hinders the working of the invention in
Canada.
(3) Section 67 (2)(c)
Demand for the patented article in Canada is not met to an adequate extent and on reasonable terms.
(4) Section 67 (2)(d)
- Refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms, resulting in prejudice to the trade or industry of Canada, or the establishment of a new
trade or industry in Canada, provided it is in the public interest that a
license be granted.
(5) Section 67(2)(e)
- The conditions attached by the patentee to the purchase, license
or use of the patented article, or to the using or working of the patented
process, result in prejudice to trade or industry in Canada.
(6) Section 67 (2)(f)
Use of a patent for a process involving the use of materials not
protected by the patent, or for an invention relating to a substance produced by such process, to unfairly prejudice the manufacture, use or sale
in Canada of any such materials.
Section 68 of the Patent Act provides for remedies where abuse is
established. The remedies fall into two principal categories: a) the grant
of a compulsory license, and b) the revocation of the patent.
Where a case of abuse is established, the Commissioner may order
the grant of a license on such terms as he thinks expedient. The license
may include a term which precludes the licensee from importing into
Canada any article or goods covered by the patent. In such event, the
patentee and any existing licensees shall no longer have the right to import the patented article into Canada. Any compulsory license granted
by the Commissioner gives the licensee the right to call on the patentee to
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enforce the patent against infringers, and failure to do so within two
months of a request for enforcement will result in the licensee having the
right to institute proceedings in its own name.
The Commissioner may grant an exclusive license where the invention is not being employed on a commercial scale in Canada and an abuse
of the exclusive rights is established under either (1) or (2) of the abuses
referred to above, and he is satisfied that, in order to justify the expenditure of capital necessary to employ the invention in Canada, exclusive
rights are required. Any such exclusive license granted by the Commissioner is required to secure to the patentee the maximum royalty which is
compatible with the licensee who is employing the invention in Canada
on a commercial scale and at a reasonable profit, and to guarantee to the
patentee a minimum yearly sum by way of royalty, if it is reasonable to
do so with regard to the capital required for the proper employment of
the invention. Orders and decisions of the Commissioner of Patents
under these abuse provisions are appealable to the Federal Court.
PROSPECTS

Although there have been flurries of excitement about fundamental
changes in the laws establishing industrial property rights, there is little
evidence that the general subject is a high priority policy issue in Canada.
The amendments to the Patent Act now under consideration in Parliament focus on the pharmaceutical licensing issue (a question not essentially related to competition policy) and include a number of changes
such as introducing first-to-file in place of first-to-invent and replacing
the seventeen-years-from-grant rule with the more widespread twentyyears-from-filing rule. Otherwise, debate is hard to find on the patent
front. Attention is being given to some important issues in copyright,
but, to my knowledge, there is no expressed concern about the competition law interface.
CONCLUSION

Intellectual property rights are similar to the other property rights
in that they may be exploited subject to other relevant considerations.
One of those considerations is competition law. While a body of experience has developed around the abuse provisions, none of the jurisprudence explores the relevance of competition law. It is significant that
there has not been any case experience in Canada to refine the issues and
delineate the interface or define the overlap between competition law and
intellectual property law. After a diligent search for clues, I have to tell
you that there are none!

